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NEGLIGENCE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-'-An owner left his car in defendants'
parking garage with the key in the ignition. Defendants' employee stole the
car and loaned it to X who had no knowledge of the theft. X, while driving
the car, ran into plaintiff nearly twelve hours after the theft. Held, as a matter
of law defendants were not guilty of negligence. Assuming, however, that
defendants were negligent, such negligence was not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries. Howard v. Swagart, (App. D.C. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 651.
Plaintiff relied upon two earlier decisions of the same court. In Ross v.
Hartman, 1 an agent left his principal's truck unattended in a public alley, with
the key in the switch and ignition unlocked in violation of an ordinance. Within
two hours, a thief negligently ran over a third person who recovered damages
from the principal. The court reasoned that the purpose of the ordinance was
"to promote the safety of the public in the streets," 2 that violation- of the ordinance was negligence, that this negligence created the risk that a third person
would act improperly and brought about the harm which the ordinance was
intended to prevent, and that therefore the negligence was the proximate cause
of the harm. The court did not say whether, in the absence of the ordinance,
there would have been negligence. However, in Schaff v. R.W. Claxton, lnc.,8
the court held, although the ordinance did not apply, that the jury might properly find an agent negligent when he left his employer's truck, 'with the keys
in it, unattended in a parking lot next to a restaurant. The court further held
that the jury might find such negligence the proximate cause of a third person's
injuries, for which the agent's employer would be liable, such injuries having
been sus~4Ied by the third person when run into by an intermeddler who had
taken the truck from the parking space. In the present case the court states
that it would be possible to extend the holdings of these two decisions to the
case now under consideration, but it refuses to do so on the ground that such
an extension of liability would result in "~ strained construction of the legal

1 (App. D.C. 1943)
Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778
2 139 F. (2d) 14 at
3 (App. D.C. 1944)

139 F. (2d) 14. Contra: Slater v. T.C. Baker Co., 261
(1927).
15.
144 F. (21) 532.
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concepts pertammg to negligence and proximate cause." 4 It is pertinent to
inquire whether the two earlier decisions have not already had this effect. A
preliminary question is whether defendant, or his agent, was under a duty to
plaintiff not to leave the key in the ignition. Aside from the ordinance, this
question must be answered in the negative under Jutice Cardozo'~ concept of
duty 5 if there was no unreasonable risk of harm to plaintiff from defendant's
act. However, the penal ordinance can make up for the absence of a common
law duty if it was adopted for the benefit of persons like plaintiff.6 Quite possibly the ordinance was adopted to benefit taxpayers by decreasing police expenditures with reference to stolen cars, to benefit car owners, and also to
benefit pedestrians. However, if the harm which occurred was not a result of
a risk which the ordinance was intended to prevent, plaintiff cannot rely upon
a violation of the ordinance to establish negligence.' While the ordinance might
well have been intended to protect pedestrians against the risk of a child driver
who .finds a car with the key left in the ignition, it is less certain that the
ordinance was intended to prevent the risk to pedestrians of a thief who is
driving a stolen car. A thief is not likely to be an unusual menace to public
safety on the highway unless his anxiety to get away from the scene of the
theft makes him careless. If negligence cannot be established by proof-of violation of the ordinance, the answer to the question whether leaving the keys in
the ignition is negligence should depend upon the peculiar circumstances of
each case. When the car is parked in a public place where thefts are known
to be of common occurrence, it may be negligence to leave the keys in tl).e car. 8
However, the court in the principal. case holds that "leaving a car unlocked
in a private parking-lot garage does not constitute negligence" 9 but is actually
desirable to facilitate delivery of the car to the owner at a moment's notice and
to make possible the prompt removal of the car in case of fire. But, assuming
defendant negligent, was such negligence the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries? The court .jn the present case finds no proximate causation, stressing
the twelve hour interval between the theft and the accident 10 and the two
4

Principal case at 655.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
6
Buckzkowski v. Canton R. Co., 181 Md. 377, 30 A. (2d) 257 (1943).
7
De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co. of Mass., 258 N.Y. 350, 179 N.E. 764
(1932).
8
ln Malloy v. Newman, 310 Mass. 269, 37 N.E. (2d) 1001 (1941), defendant
left his car iJil the street, with the key in the ignition. A thief stole the car and ran into
the plaintiff. Though it is difficult to see how the violation of a registration statute
was in fact the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the court held defendant liable because
of his failure to register the car as the statute required. The court stresses defendant's
knowledge of many previous thefts in the same neighborhood; and conceivably there
was a breach of a common law duty which was in fact a cause of plaintiff's injury.
9
Principal case at 6 55.
10 The court does not mention Professor Beale in the principal case, but in
stressing the twelve hour interval it seems to be adopting his view that, where defendant's negligence has come to rest in a position of apparent safety and some new
force later combines with this condition to cause injury, such injury is only a remote
consequence of defendant's act. Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act," 33
5
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intervening persons, one a thief and the other not. In the Schaff case the court
did not mention the amount of intervening time and held the intervention of
a thief did not make the causation remote. The Ross case reached the same
result when less than two hours intervened between the theft and the accident.
If the foreseeability test of proximate causation is to be used when the causation
is indirect,11 then the question arises whether defendant, or his agent, might
reasonably have foreseen the intervention of a thief under the attending circumstances. It is not a necessary, or even compelling, conclusion that the combined
intervention of a thief and a third person to whom the thief loans the stolen
vehicle is so much more unforeseeable than the mere intervention of a thief
alone that the former situation makes the causation remote as a matter of law
while the jury may properly find the latter a matter of proximate causation.
It is submitted that the two situations do not differ significantly and that in
either case the real question is whether the attending circumstances make the
intervention of a thief foreseeable. That a thief may take a car with the keys
left in it from an easily accessible place is certainly more foreseeable than that
he may take such car from a garage; and possibly this difference in the degree
of foreseeability will alone justify calling the consequence proximate in the
Ross and Schaff cases 12 but remote in the present case.

W. Stirling Maxwell

HARV. L. REv. 633 (1920). However, a New York court has held a negligent defendant liable, though his active force had been at rest in a position of apparent
safety for a period of six months, on the ground that it was not at rest "in legal contemplation." Henningsen v. Markowitz, 132 Misc. 547 at 550, 230 N.Y.S. 353

(1928).
11 "If ..• the injury is only the indirect . . • result of the alleged negligence
then it must have been foreseen or anticipated in the light of the circumstances [ for
the negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury]." Nunan v. Bennett, 184 Ky.
591 at 595, 212 S.W. 570 at 572 (1919).
12 However, a Louisiana decision held that the theft of defendant's truck was
not "reasonably within the contemplation of defendant's driver" when he left the
truck parked in the street, with the motor running, while making a delivery. "The
&ituation would be different if the accident had been caused by a child attracted by
the running motor. • . . " Castay v. Katz & Besthoff, Ltd., (La. App. 1933) 148
S. 76 at 78.

